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ABSTRACT
This paperattempts to bridge the gap between the theoreticalliterature examining how innovation
affects income across countries and the empirical literature examining how relative wages within
a country changeover time. We test the hypothesis that the relative wage between workersin
high-and low-technology industries within a country is a function of the rate of domestic
innovation and innovation abroad. To test this hypothesis data for 7 European countries for the
years 1971-1988 are used. The empirical results show that the relative rates of innovation (as
measured by theratioofpatentsto high-tech workers) are significant determinants oftherelative
wage.
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Recent theoretical work has examined the implications oftechnological changeand international
trade among innovating countries, that is, how innovation affectsthe terms oftrade and economic growth
(see, forexample, Grossman and Helpman, 1992, and Dinopoulos, 1992). This literature, however, has
not discussed possible domestic redistributive effects of innovation, because the models have only one
type of worker in each country. Nevertheless, even though it does not address possible effects of
innovationonsectoral wage differences within countries, thistheoretical literaturesuggeststhe importance
of innovation in determiningdifferences in wages across countries.
Recent empirical studies have triedto explain changing sectoral wage differentials, particularly
in the 1980s.’ While this research has attributed much of the shift to technical change, only Mincer
(1991) has actuallyincluded a measure ofinnovative activity. Similarly, while the increase in the amount
of trade worldwide has been thought to play a role in determining sectoral wage differentials, the
empirical measures ofexternal influences have generally been import-penetration ratios or changes in the
tradebalance. These variables may not capture the way in whichtrade in new technologies, in particular,
could affect labor compensation. Thus, while these studies have been successful in explaining supply and
demand shifts, they have been unable to directly address the current public policy debate regarding the
role of international competition in high-technology industries in determining domestic relative wages.
The work presented here attempts to bridge the gap between these somewhat divergent theoretical and
empirical strandsofresearch. We usethe product-cyclemodel developed by Butler (1993), which allows
for two sectors in each country: an innovating (high-technology) and non-innovating (low-technology)
‘For studies ofthe relative wage for the United States, see, for example, Katz and Murphy (1992),
and Mincer (1991). For a study that looks at the effect oftechnology on relativedemand for labor, see
Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994). For a study ofrelative wagesfor European countries, see OECD
(1993) and Davis (1992).
1sector. In addition, there are two types of workers, with the more skilled workers employed in the
innovating sector and the lower-skilled workers in the non-innovating sector. Because each innovating
country has a non-innovating sector, technology is eventually transferred from the innovating sector of
a country to the non-innovating sector of both countries. The product-cycle model implies that the
relative wage between workers in high- andlow-technology industries within a country (hereafter called
the domestic relative wage) is a function ofnot only the rate of domestic innovation but ofinnovation
abroad as well. Hence, the competitiveness of a country’s innovating sector relative to its foreign
counterparts, as measured by the relative innovation rate, is thought to play a large role in determining
the domestic relative (high-tech to low-tech) wage.
To test whether high-tech workers competewith eachother internationally, we usedatafor seven
relatively integratedEuropean economies spanning the years 1971-1988. The data come from a recently
created data set from the OECD that has consistent disaggregated manufacturing wage andemployment
data. The empirical results showthat, while the product-cyclemodel doesnot providean exactly suitable
empirical specification, it does suggest which variables should enter a generalized empirical specification
that fits the data reasonably well. Furthermore, the relative innovation rates (where innovation is
measured by the number of high-tech patents per high-tech worker within a country) is a significant
determinant of the relative wage. This result supports the product-cycle hypothesis that foreign
innovation affects the domestic income distribution.
In attempting to focus directly on the role innovation plays in determining relative wages, we
abstract from some interesting issues examined elsewhere. Thus we are unable, in great part due to data
limitations, to identify supply and demand effects in determining relative wages. For a more complete
description of relative wages on a microeconomic level for European countries, see Davis (1992) and
OECD (1993).
2The paper begins with a description of the formal model from Butler (1993). The complete
model is presented in the appendix. The next section presents the data and highlights the hypotheses
concerningthe importance of innovation rates. The econometric methods and results follow. The paper
concludes with a summary ofthe results.
THE MODEL:
The Household Sector:
Consumers have identical time-separable preferences, characterized by a standard intertemporal
utility function. Consumersvaluebothvariety and quantity, as represented by the following instantaneous
CES utility function:
(1) u~= [J~t) C(a)°]~da 0<0<1,
where:
C(a) = consumption of good ‘a.’
0 = weight consumers place on quantity relative to variety.
[0, ~l(t)Jis the continuum of different varieties available at time t.
For notational convenience we order the different types ofvarieties in the following manner:
varieties in the low-techsector E [0, ~t)],
varieties in the high-tech sector in Country 2 E (~I,~(t), ~1~(t)J, and
varieties in the high-tech sector of Country 1 E (~~(t), ~(t)] 2
2Hereafter, the time notation will be suppressed.
3To avoid the problem of diverging to infinite variety, some goods are assumed to go out of
fashion and are no longer consumed (or produced) .~. The number of varieties that goes out offashion
is given at any time by gN(t), where g is the parameter determining the rate at which goods go out of
fashion, 0<g< 1, and N(t) = ~(t) - 0.~Because preferences are the same in both countries, ‘g’ is not
country-dependent. Utility is maximized at each moment of time, given the variety available. Varieties
are available from three sectors: the innovating sectors in the two countries, and in the low technology
sector.5
Choosing low tech goods as a numeraire, normalizingon the price oflow-tech goods, denoting
relative prices and wages by upper case letters and solving results in the following demand functions:
(2) Cea = Y/Z. Va E [0, ~l~]
(3) Cia = 1~ia~ Y/Z Va E (~2h, ~
(4) C~= P~YIZ Va E (~, ~J.
where:
Z = ~
1~a = price ofgood ‘a’, ae[0,~},
3Not every good stops being consumed, as not all types of goods go out of fashion. Rather, some
proportion of goods stop being consumed. Another approach would be to have quality cycles, where
innovation takes the form of improvements in existing products. Quality cycles are generated using
Cobb-Douglas utility, in which there can be no demand for umnvented products (see, for example,
Grossman andHelpman, 1991a, 199ib). One recent exception is an unpublished work by Dinopoulos
(1992), in which both quality and product cycles occur in an economy. The model, however, does not
provide closed-form solutions for empirical implementation.
4To simplify the analysis, we assume an equal proportion of goods go out of fashion in each sector.
5Because the variety available in the low-technology sector is the same in both countries, the country
subscript is suppressed.
4= 11(1-0) is the (constant) elasticity ofsubstitutionbetween any two varieties, and
Y = world income.
Production:
There are two types of workers: low-productivity workers, who can only work in the low-
technology sector, and high-productivity workers, who can work in either the high- or low-technology
sector. We assume returns to skill are zeroin the low-tech sector so that if skilled workers are employed
in that sector, they receive the same wage as the low-skilled workers. Workers are immobile
internationally. The labor market is perfectly competitive and wages are flexible. The reservation wage
is assumed to be sufficiently below the wage in the low-technology sector to ensure all workers are
employed.
The High-Technology Sector:
All firms have identical innovation and production functions. Firms are product monopolists in
the sense that they innovate different products, yet linear technology makes entry easy, thereby making
demand elastic for any given good. Because technology is linear, the number and scale of firms is
indeterminate. R&D is required for innovation to occur and any given variety is produced by a single
firm. Skilled workers can work in either production or R&D (although compensation is the same
irrespective of where they work in that sector). Technology transfer is costless and is proportional to the
amount of variety available in the high-tech sector. There is free entry in innovation in the sense that
any firm which hires R&D workers can innovate. The structure ofthe innovating sector is the same in
both countries. All results are derived for Country One; the results for Country Two can be found by
changing the country-specificparameters.
5The firm solves forthe optimal time path ofvarietyby maximizing total discountedprofits, given
the price and output level foreach good, which come out ofa static maximization problem. The amount
ofR&D labor the firm hires determines the variety ofgoods it produces. Firms always have an incentive
to innovatebecause they are always losing varieties, dueto technology transfer andgoods going out of
fashion.
Defining NIh as the numberofvarieties available at any time in the high-tech sector ofCountry
One, the rate ofchange ofvariety in that sector is given by:
(5) dNih/dt = iIL!hR - kiNih - gN,~,
where
Nih = — ~2h,
L,hR is the number of R&D workers hired,
i1 is the productivity parameter associated with R&D workers in Country One, and
k, is the rate at whichtechnology is transferred from the innovating sector in Country One
to the non-innovating sector.
Production is characterized by constant returns to scale, and given by:
(6) Qia = a1L1~1, Va E (~2h’~I
where:
= the productivityparameter associated with high-technology workers in Country One, and
Lia” = the number of high-tech workers employed in the production of good ‘a’ in the
innovating good sector of Country One.
6Becausethe innovation and productionfunctions are linear with respect to the decision variables,
the problem is solved for a representative firm and then aggregated. The problem is solved recursively:
The production choice, subject to the demand function, is a static problem and solved first; the choice
of R&D investment, and therefore the amount of variety, is dynamic and thus solved second. The
solutionto the static maximization problem is given by:
(7) Qia = P1:Yiz.
(8) ~la = W11(a10).
where W1 is the wage paid to workers in the high-tech sector. Becausethe right-handside variables in
equation (8) do not change as ‘a’ changes, the price for all goods in this sector is the same; a markup
over the wage.
Solving the dynamic optimization problem with calculus of variations yields the following
optimality condition:
(9) [W1Ir}[(L~J(1 — 0)10 — (k, + g)1i1]_—W11i1
This condition requires firms to hire R&D workersjust up to the point where the current cost ofR&D
exactly equals the discounted benefit of future production. Because each firm is the sole producer of a
given variety, the firm earns monopoly profits. These profits, however, are just sufficient to cover the
costs ofR&D. If, forexample, the benefits ofR&D exceeded the costs, firms would demand more R&D
workers or there would be more entrants in R&D. This would require hiring more R&D workers, which
would, for the industry as a whole, drive up the wage and reduce profits. This would continue until the
gap betweenbenefits and costs was eliminated. At that point, equation (9) would once again hold.
7Using the optimality conditions, the labor constraint that there is a fixed number of skilled
workers andthe stability propertiesof equation(5), we can solve directly forthe steady-state variety and
the allocation of production and R&D workers:
(10) Lj~’= (r + k1
+ g)0L1~I(k1
+ g + Or),
(11) L~= (1 — O)(k1
+ g)L1~/(k, + g + Or),
(12) Nih = i,(1 — O)LlhI(k, + g + Or),
where L,,, is the total number of skilled workers in Country One.
The Low-Technology Sector:
The low-technology sector produces only goods forwhichtechnology is internationally available.
This technology comes from the two innovating sectors. Thus, technology is transferred not only from
onecountry to another, but between sectors within acountry. LettingN~ denote the number of varieties
in the low-tech sector, equation (19) describes rate of change of variety in that sector.
(13) dN~/dt= kiN,h + k2N~, - g N~, 1 > k1,k 2, g > 0,
where
k2 is the technology transfer rate for Country 2,
N2,, = ~ih - ~ and
N~ =~-0.
The steady-state solution for N~ is given by :6
6This equation is a first order linear difference equationwhich asymptotically reaches a steady state.
The equation is insensitive to changes in initial conditions.
8(14) N [(1-0)1 [ i,k1L,,, + i2~L2,,
L g ] [k1+g+or k2+g+Or
The production technology for low-technology workers is given by:
(15) Q~ =
where a~ isthe productivityparameter associated with low-tech workers. Perfect competition in both the
input and output markets, along with the same production technology in both countries and symmetric
preferences, ensures the price ofthese goods are the same. Inequilibrium, the realwage equals marginal
product; that is:
(16) P( = WeIc3~e.
THEORETICAL RESULTS
From the supply constraints and the steady-state solutions derived above, the domestic relative
wage is given by:




(r+k1+g){ [L1,,k1/(k, +g+Or)] + [(i2Ii,)L2~k2I(k2+g+Or)]} I e
One ofthe unique resultsofthe model is givenby the domestic relative wage between high- and
low-technology workers within a country.7 The model predicts that a relative increase in one country’s
~For other results, see Butler (1993).
9productivity in R&D has a positive effect on that country’s domestic relative wage and a negative effect
on the domestic relative wage of the other country. An increase in the relative productivity of R&D
workers increases variety and therefore the demand for high-technology goods of that country. The
increase in innovation also leads to an increase in variety in the low-technology sector in both countries,
which increases the quantity demanded ofthese less-expensive goods. The effect of increased innovation
in the high-tech sector dominates the demand effect in the low-tech sector ofthat country, andthe relative
wage increases. The increase in demand forgoods from the low-technology sector of the other country,
however, is not offset by any change in variety in its high-technology sector and its relative wage
declines. Thus, the relative rate of innovation (or, more precisely, the relative productivity of R&D
workers in the two countries) is a significant determinant ofthe wage differential withina country.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
The Data
The data are annual for the period 1971-1988. Complete data are available for 7 European
countries: France, the former West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, andthe United
Kingdom. Industries are classified as high-tech by their R&D intensity, as defined by the ratio of R&D
to output (see OECD, 1986 for more detail). Wage and employment data are not available at the 3-digit
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) for the time period, so 2-digit classification was
generally used. The one exception is fabricated metal products (ISIC 381), which has a very low R&D-
intensity according to the OECD, but would be included in the high-technology industries if a strict 2-
digit classification was used because ISIC 38 contains primarilyhigh-technology sectors. Complete data
are available for fabricated metal products, however, so it is included as a low-technology industry. As
a result, the industries are classified as high- and low-tech as shown in Table 1.
10Becauseof the breadth of two-digit industries, some lower-technology industries are included in
the high-technology category. This misclassificationisexpected to biasthe results against our hypothesis,
because it increases the number of high-technology workers and should decrease the wage difference
between the two types of workers.
Wage and employment data come from the OECD Structural Analysis Industrial Database, which
is a new data set of internationally comparable data constructed by the OECD~8 The employment data
are essentially a head count of wage and salary workers. They are divided into high- and low-tech
employment in each country by the R&D intensity of the industry as defined above.
The data used to calculate the wage gap between high- and low-tech workers are labor costs,
which include the costs of employers payments fornon-wage compensation such as medicalcoverage and
pensions, and are the total wage bill for that industry for a year. This variable is summed over the
industries in that sector anddivided by the total number of workers in that sector within a country to get
the wage bill per worker in each sector. The domestic relative wage is then the ratio of annual wages
per worker in the high-tech sector relativeto the low-tech sector. In the data, the domestic relativewage
was greater thanone forall countries in all years. The relative high-tech/low-tech manufacturing wage
increased on average in the sample period (1971-1988) in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and
Italy; it decreased on average in the Netherlands, Swedenand Norway. Figure 1 plots the relative wage
for all seven countries. Italy had the largest gap between high-tech and low-tech wages throughout the
sample period.
Because the innovation parameter in the model is ameasure ofthe productivityofR&D workers,
the proxy used is patents per worker, which is simply the number of patents in the high-tech sector
dividedby the number of high-technology workers in that country. Foreign innovation is proxied by the
number of patents in the high-tech sector in the other six countries divided by the number of high-tech
°Formore information on the data andhow it was created, see OECD (1992).
11workers in the same six countries. Figure 2 plots the relative innovation rates for the seven countries.
For Italy, the ratio of patents per foreign high-tech workers to patents per domestic high-tech workers
was the highest throughout the sample. Norway, the smallest country, had the most variable relative
innovation rate, dueto lumpiness in the number of domestic patents. The variability is not sufficiently
greatto cause changes in the ranking of Norway’s innovation rate relative to other countries, however.
Finding an appropriate empirical measure of product innovation is difficult and has been
extensively discussed in the literature. Using patents as aproxy may be insufficientbecause many goods
are not patented. Nevertheless, patents do provide a means of measuring the degree to which the
production rights of products or processes are exclusive. In general, patents have been found to be a
good indicator of unobserved inventive output (see, for example, Griliches, 1990). The other proxy
available is R&D expenditures. R&D data are available from the OECD for each country, but
disaggregated industry-level data available are incomplete. In addition,not all R&D results in innovation.
Patent data also have the advantage ofbeing available over a long time horizon and in great detail and
represent the output from R&D deemed to have economic value.
One problem with using patents is that patent laws vary across countries, whereas we want a
consistent measure of innovation within an industry. To alleviate this problem, we use patents filed in
the United States Y These are available at the three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level
from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office)° Foreign patent data are highly correlated with both
domestic patenting and R&D intensity, minimizing the costs of choosing one over the other.”
~As suggested by Zvi Griliches in conversation. In addition, see Soete and Wyatt (1983) for a
discussion of using foreign patenting for an international comparison of innovation.
‘°Thesewere converted into ISIC using the concordance study by Jim Kristoff at the Bureau of
Census.
‘1See Soete and Wyatt (1983). For adiscussion on the use of patents as an indicator of innovative
activity, see Griliches, Pakes and Hall (1987), and Griliches (1990).
12The parameters characterizing obsolescence, utility, and technology transfer are assumed to be
the same across time. The obsolescence and utility parameters are the same across countries in the
theoretical model and no good measures exist for use as proxies. At present, no empirical measure of
technology transfer exists, so any differences in the rate of technology transfer across countries is
capturedby fixed effects in the panel data.
Another parameter from the theoretical model, production worker productivity, presents some
challenges for the empirical work. Labor is the only input in the theoretical model, but for empirical
purposes a measure of productivity within each sector is needed. While no perfect measure exists, we
use value-addedper high-technology worker divided by value-addedper low-technology worker to atleast
partially account for differences in worker productivityacross countries and time.
The Empirical Examination
Equation (17) is manipulated to have the form of a panel-data regression equation, which leads
to several statistical tests of hypotheses related to the model. A maintained assumption is that the rate
of technology transfer is the same across countries in equation (17), 50 that k, = k2. We can then write
the relative wage as
1 —O
(18) = 4 (a~Ic~)°
where
= ~ g(k+g+Or) ‘°
(r+k+g)k
Rearranging the right hand side of equation(18) and taking logs, we obtain for Country 1
13(19) 1n(i!~)= In(4) + 0 In(a~/a~) + (O_1)1n(~i~÷~~)
where subscripts h and £ denote the high-tech and low-tech industries, respectively. L21, denotes
employment in high-tech industries in the “rest of the world,” i.e., the other six countries, Le is
worldwide low-tech employment, and i2 denotes the innovation rate in rest of the world. Equation (19)
suggests that the relative endowments of high-tech to low-tech workers worldwide is a primary
determinantofthe relativehigh-tech to low-techwage rate in a givencountry. Furthermore, equation (19)
suggests that the numbers ofhigh-tech workers should be weighted by a measure of relative innovation
productivity before aggregating across countries. Recalling from equation (1) that 0 is a parameter
betweenzero and one, the model predicts a negativeregression coefficient equalto (0-1) in equation (19).
Equation (19) highlights several possible explanations of why the domestic relative wage varies
across countries. To illustrate the keyhypothesis of this article, assume that two countries, say France
and Italy, have identical relative endowments of high-technology workers and that France has a higher
innovation rate than Italy. The notation
i2
i~ FM
indicates the innovation rate in the rest of the world relative to that in the home country when France is
the home country, becausethe subscript 1 stands for home country and 2 for rest of world. The model
predicts that in France the wage premium forhigh-tech workers will be higher than in Italy, assuming
that q’ from equation (19) is the same in the two countries:




In the data analysis, however, we do not necessarily expect to be able to explain idiosyncratic
reasons why a given country has a particular gap between high- and low-tech wage rates, so we allow
forfixed effects in eachcountry. We also allow forthe possibility that innovationrates and domestic and
foreign labor supplies do notinteract strictly according to the specification in equation (19) in determining
the domestic relative wage. Thus, the rigid functional form implied by the theoretical model is relaxed,
although we test some restrictions implied by the theoretical model of (19). Consequently, the last term
on the the right-hand side variable from equation (19) is divided into components that isolate, for
example, the effects ofthe relative innovationrate and the domestic hightech/low tech labor endowment
on the domestic relative wage:
(20) 1nI~+~~ = h~ +ln1~ +In(~+hu(-~ (~L1 i1 L0) ~L~ ~ L0 I~,i~ (~ Llh
with a remainder on the right-hand side, expressed as a Taylor’s series expansion, equal to
IL i LWi 2
l—~_1_i — ____~IIj_1 +....
~~Lh i~ Lh)~i2
Table 2 lists the variables of the full model. In the estimation, all explanatory variables, Xl-X5, are
lagged to avoid simultaneity bias.
The pooled time-series and cross-section data set is estimated by maximum-likelihood, allowing
for bothautoregressive andcross-sectionally correlatederrors. The autoregressivecomponentis removed
15by quasi-differencing the data, witha different AR coefficient for each country. The error covariance
matrix is obtained, conditional on the values ofthe regression coefficients andAR coefficients, by putting
(21) ~ u1~u~~
into the covariance matrix, where u, and u~ are the error vectors for countries i andj. Country-specific
means are swept out of the error vectors, so the number of degrees of freedom used to calculate the t-
statistics and probability values is reduced accordingly.
Table 2 contains the parameter estimates for the panel data set. In overall fit, the model (with
quasi-differenced data) achieves an R-squared of .710.12 The importance of the foreign innovation rate,
relative to the domestic rate, in determining domestic wages is the most novel empirical finding. The
significantly negative coefficient onthe percentage gapbetweenthe rest-of-worldanddomestic innovation
rates (X3) conforms with the prediction of the product-cycle model and suggests that countries that do
not innovate well relative to their competitors have a smaller wage premium in the high-technology
sector.
The strict product-cycle specification of equation (19), in which X1-X5 have identical, negative
coefficients, clearly does not hold, however. In fact Xl, X2 and X4 have significant, positive
coefficients, whereas X3 and X5 havenegative coefficients. The positivecoefficient on Xl implies that
high-tech wages have tended to increase even as the relativenumber of high-tech workers haveincreased.
This suggests that workers of various types should not be viewed as exogenously given factor
endowments. Instead, it appears that, on average, an outwardly shifting demand curve for high-tech
12This R-squared is measured from the quasi-differenced data with country means swept out. Hence,
significant country intercepts and autoregressive parameters do not contribute at all to the R-squared; all
of it is due to the regression coefficients, thereby maintaining the convention that the R-squared would
be zero if all regression coefficients are zero.
16workers led to endogenous increases in the number of high-tech workers andin their wages. Essentially,
increases in demand appear to dominate increases in the supply of high-tech workers, so changes in the
supply of domestic skilled labor are positively correlated withtheir wages. This result is consistent with
studies done for the United States (e.g. Katz and Murphy, 1992), as well as a recent study from the
OECD (1993).
Recalling that country-specific means have been swept out of the variables, X2 and X4 represent
acountry’s share of total low-tech workers and inverse of the share of high-tech workers, respectively,
relative to the mean shares. Thus, if acountry’s share of low-tech workers rises above its mean level,
thenthat country’s labor force has hadto absorb arelatively large number of low-tech workers compared
with other countries and the low-tech wage falls relative to the high-tech wage. This absorption
hypothesis explains the observed positive coefficients on X2 and X4, although it does not form part of
the basic product-cycle model. The product-cycle model provides a steady-state equilibrium domestic
relative wage, without dynamics explaining what happens in the short run when a country’s low-tech
labor force grows more rapidly than its neighbors.
For the variable X5 [equation (20)], the terms in the Taylor series expansion will converge
quickly to zero, becausein no casedoes acountry’s innovation rate exceed one by an amount greater than
the reciprocal of that country’s share of total high-tech workers. For this reason, X5 should be viewed
as an interaction variable between the innovation rate and the share of high-tech workers, i.e., the first
term ofthe expansion. The negativesign, whichwas implied by the model, suggests that the combination
of ahigh innovation rate and a relatively small number of high-tech workers to absorb has a synergistic
effect in raising the high-tech wage premia above that implied by each factor separately.
The gap in value-addedper worker across the two sectors has the expected positive sign: As the
gap between the value added by high-tech and low-tech workers widens, the relative wage of high-tech
workers increases. Another variable we investigated as aproxy for production worker productivity was
17fixed-capital investment per high-tech worker divided by fixed-capital investment per low-tech worker,
but the coefficient was not significant and it was not included in the empirical model.
The AR coefficients in Table 2 show that Norway appears to have a unit root, but thisdoes not
invalidate the estimation procedure. The presence of the unit rootsimply implies that wefully difference
the Norwegianvariables, rather than quasi-difference.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper uses industry-level data on European manufacturing firms to provide empirical tests
of several propositions regarding domestic relative high-tech/low-tech wages stemming from a
product-cycle model. The most novel empirical finding is the importance of foreign innovation in the
high-tech sector in determining the domestic relative wage. While there has been much rhetoric
surrounding the effects of increased competition in high-technology industries, these results demonstrate
how foreign innovation can empirically affect wages in high-technology industries. This result is
particularly strong given the level of aggregation we were required to use, which is likely to bias the
results against our hypothesis. We find if high-tech workers in competing countries begin to innovate
more rapidly relative to domestic high-tech workers, thenthe relative wage between domestic high- and
low-tech workers tends to decline. Similarly, if domestic high-tech workers innovatefaster, then,ceteris
paribus, the percentage gap between domestic high- and low-tech workers will increase. The latter result
is consistent with the results ofMincer (1991) for the United States and provides more rigorous support
for the argument discussed by Davis (1992) and elsewhere that domestic proficiency in technological
innovation plays a role in determining domestic relative wages.
Future research could expand the data set to include the United States, Canada and Japan.
Because trade as a share of GDP is considerably smaller for the United States than the other countries
18in the sample, it would be interesting to test whether foreign innovation has as large an impact on
domestic high-tech/low-tech wages in the United States as it does in other countries.
19BIBLIOGRAPHY
Berman, Eli, Bound, John, and Zvi Griliches, “Changes in the Demand for Skilled Labor within U.S.
Manufacturing Industries: Evidence from the Annual Survey of Manufacturing,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, (May 1994), pp.367-97).
Butler, Alison, A Generalized Approach to Product Cycle Models in International Trade, unpublished
dissertation, University of Oregon (1989).
_____ “Endogenous Innovationand ProductCycles inAdvanced Countries,” mimeo (revised May 1993).
Davis, StevenJ., “Cross-Country Patterns of Change in RelativeWages,” in Blanchard, Olivier Jean and
Stanley Fischer, eds. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1992, (Cambridge: MIT Press 1992), pp.239-291.
Dinopoulos, Elias, “Schumpeterian Product Evolution and Vanishing Growth,” mimeo (revised June
1992).
Dixit, Avinash, and Joseph Stiglitz, “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity,”
American Economic Review (June 1977), pp. 297-308.
Griliches, Zvi, “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature
(December 1990), pp. 1661-1707.
Griliches, Zvi, Pakes, Ariel, and Bronwyn H. Hall, “The Value of Patents as Indicators of Inventive
Activity,” in Partha Dasgupta andPaul Stoneman, eds., Economic Policy andTechnologicalPerformance
(Cambridge University Press 1987), pp. 97-124.
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman, “Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth,” Review of
Economic Studies (January l991a) pp. 43-61.
_____ “QualityLadders and Product Cycles, Quarterly Journal of Economics (May 199ib), pp. 557-86.
Katz, Lawrence F., and Kevin M. Murphy, “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and
Demand Factors, “ Quarterly Journal of Economics (February 1992), pp. 35-78.
Kristoff, Jim, “United States Industries Standard Industrial Classification Regrouped to International
Standard Classification forUnited States Tables,” mimeo (September 1992).
Mincer, Jacob, “Human Capital, Technology, and the Wage Structure: What do Time Series Show?,”
NBER Working Paper No. 3581 (January 1991).
OECD, Employment Outlook, (July 1993).
_____ DSTI(STAN/Industrial Database), 1992.
_____ OECD Science and Technology Indicators, No 2: R&D, Invention and Competitiveness, 1986.
20Soete, L. G., and Sally M.E. Wyatt, “The Use of Foreign Patenting as an Internationally Comparable
Science andTechnology Output Indicator,” Scientometrics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1983) 31-54.
21APPENDIX
THE HOUSEHOLD SECTOR
Infinitely-lived consumers have identical time-separable preferences, characterized by the
following intertemporal utility function:
(Al) V = Je~ u(.)dt,
where r is the constant consumers discount rate and u(.) is the instantaneous utility function, whichis a
CES utility function given by:’3
(A2) u~= [J ~ C(a)°] ~da 0<0<1,
where:
C(a) = consumption of good ‘a.’
[0,~1(t)]is the continuum of varieties available attime t.
For notational convenience we order the different types of varieties in the following manner:
varieties in the low-tech sector E [0, ~J0(t)],
varieties in the high-tech sector in Country 2 E (~e(t),~~(t)], and
varieties in the high-tech sector of Country 1 E ((i~,,(t),~(t)] ~
‘3This utility function, taken from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), has the property that all goods of the
same prices are valued the same.
‘4Hereafter, the time notation will be suppressed.
22Preferences are assumed to be the same for all individuals in both countries, so this function is
treated as an aggregateutilityfunction, but prices are considered parameters as ifthe utility functionwere
maximized for each individual and then aggregated. With these preferences, individuals consume all
goods that are produced. Utility is maximized at each moment of time, given the amount of variety
available in the two high-technology sectors (determined via firm optimization below) and in the low-
technology sector.
Consumers value both quantity and variety, which is captured by the parameter 0. The closer
O is to 1, the more consumers value quantity relative to variety. To avoid the problemofinfinite variety,
we assume some goods go out of fashion. As a result, consumers cease consuming a certain percentage
of goods each period. The number of varieties that goes out of fashion is given at any time by gN(t),
where g is the parameter determining the rate at which goods go out of fashion, 0< g< 1, and N(t) =
~(t) - 0.‘~ Because preferences are the same in both countries, ‘g’ is not country-dependent.
To determine the aggregate demand functions for goods, utility is maximized subject to world
income.’6 Perfect competition in both the input and output market for low-technology goods, combined
with the same production technology in both countries and symmetric preferences, ensures that the price
of these goods are the same.17 From the first order conditions, the relative demand between high- and
low-technology goods is:
‘5To simplify the analysis, we assume an equalproportion of goods go out of fashion in each sector.
16World income is defined as the sum of all labor income. The demand functions are linear with
respect to income and can be aggregated across individuals.
‘7For simplicity, transportation costs are assumed to be zero. Because the variety available in the
low-technology sector is the same in both countries, the country subscript is suppressed.
23(A4) = V a E (ne’ ~],V~E [0, ~
Ce P~
where = 11(1-0) is the (constant) elasticity of substitution between any two varieties.
Choosing low-tech goods as the numeraire, normalizing on the price of low-tech goods and
denoting relative prices and wages by upper case letters and solving results in the following demand
functions:
(AS) Cc = YIZ.
(A6) Cia = 1~ia~ YIZ Va E (~2h’ ~
(A7) C~= P~Y/Z Va E (~2c, ~2hI
where:
Z = J~t~P~da
1~a = price of good ‘a’, a (1, and
Y = world income.
PRODUCTION
Only skilled workers can be employed in the high-tech sector. These workers can be employed
in R&D or in production of high-tech goods. Skilled workers receive a higher wage when employed in
the high-technology sector (the wage is the same irrespective ofwhere they work in that sector), but can
work in either the high- or low-technology sector. Returns to skill are assumed to be zero in the low-
technologysector, so if skilled workers are employed in the low-technology sector, theyreceive the same
wage as the low-skilled workers. Low-skilled workers can only work in the low-technology sector.
Workers are immobile internationally. The labor market is perfectly competitiveand wages are flexible.
24The reservationwage is assumedto be sufficiently belowthe wage in the low-technology good sector to
ensure all workers are employed.
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY SECTOR:
All innovating firms within a country have identical innovation and production technology,
although they are product monopolists in the sense that they innovatedifferent products. Innovation at
any point in time is a function ofthe numberofR&D workers, and afirmproduces each innovation until
the technology is transferred to the low-technology sector or the variety go out of fashion. Technology
transfer is costless and is proportional to the amount of variety available in the high-technology good
sector. This could occur when production becomes standardized. Another interpretation is that the
production technology of aproduct is transferred when its patent expires.
Production technology is linear with constantreturns to scale.’8 As aresult, the number offirms
is indeterminant. The structure of the innovating sector is the same in both countries. All results are
derived for Country One; the results for Country Two can be found by changing the country-specific
parameters.
The firm solves for the optimal time path of R&D workers by maximizing total discounted
profits, given the price and output level for each good. The amount of R&D labor the firm hires
determines the variety of goods it produces.
The rate of change of variety for the innovating sector of Country One is given by:
(A8) dN,h/dt = i,LihR - k,N,,, -
where
Nih = — ~2h’
‘°To keep the production sector simple (since it is not theprimary focus ofthe model), the production
and innovation technologies are linear. Although this is somewhat restrictive, it also has the advantage
of providing results that are estimable.
25i, is the productivity parameter associated with R&D workers in Country One,
k1 is the rate of technology transfer for Country One, and
L”~,Jis the number of R&D workers in that sector.
Let firms be indexed such thatN,~ is the measure of the set of firmj ‘s contributionto variety and
is the distance of the interval j - ~ , where ~ ~ E (~2h~~2]. Then the law of motion that
determines the firm’s contribution to variety in the innovating sector of Country One is the same for all
firms and given by:
(A81) dN,~/dt= i,L~— k,N,~ — gN,~ 0<i1< 1, 0<k,< 1,
where ~ is the number of R&D workers in firmj.
Production is characterized by constantreturns to scale, and given by:
(A9) Qia = a,L,~, Va E (~~2h’~]
where:
a, the productivityparameter associated with high-technologyworkers in Country One, and
Lia” = the number of high-tech workers employed in the production of good ‘a’ in the
innovating good sector of Country One.
Because the innovation andproductionfunctions are linear with respect to the decisionvariables,
the problem is solved for a representative firm and then aggregated. The problem is solved recursively:
The production choice, subject to the demand function, is a static problem and solved first; the choice
of R&D investment, and therefore variety, is solved second.
The Firm’s Static Production Problem
The demand forany good ‘a’, a (Q~,,,~J], is given by equationA6. The problem facing the firm
is to maximize the following profit function subject to equations A6 and A9:
26(AlO) max ~ = ~iaQia - W,L~,- W1L~,
where
W, = the wage for high-skilled workers in the innovating sector of Country 1, and
LiaR is the number of R&D workers used to innovate good ‘a’.
Because the production decisionoccurs after R&D costs have been incurred, R&D costs are treated as
sunk costs.
Solving forthe profit-maximizing level of output gives:
(All) Qia = P~YlZ.
Substituting in and solving for the profit-maximizing price yields:
(A12) 1~ia= W,/(a,O),
These equations hold forany product a (~h’ ~],andbecause none of the variables on the right-
hand side of (A12) change as ‘a’ changes, the price of any good producedby this firm will be the same;
a constant markup over the wage. In fact, because all firms have the same production technology, the
price charged by all firms in the innovating sector of Country One is the same.
The Firm’s Dynamic R&D Problem
Firm j maximizes the following:
max
(A13) LR J e~[P,a,L~ — W,(L~+L~5]dt,
ii 0
27subject to equations A8’, All and A12, the initial condition that there are no high-tech goods without





r = producers’ discount rate, which is assumedto be the same forboth countries and equals
the consumer’s discount rate.
With substitution, equation A13 can be rewritten as:
max
(A14) N13 J e”[j3N13
— -y(dN1~/dt)]dt,
where
= W,[(L~)(l — 0)10 — (k, + g)/i,}, and
= W~Ii,.
Solving for Euler’s necessary condition for an optimum yields the following condition:
(A15) 13/r = y, which is equivalent to
EIVi,/r][(L~)(l— 0)10 — (k, + g)/i,]=W~/i,
This equilibrium condition, which holds for the industry overall, requires that the current cost
of R&D (-y) is exactly offset by the discounted benefit of future production (13/r).
To determinesteady-state variety andthe allocation ofproduction and R&D workers, A8’ is set
to zero and solved for Nih.’9 Assuming that all skilled workers are employed in the high-tech sector20,
19 Because the amount of variety is bounded by the number of skilled workers, variety is
asymptotically stable and converges for all values of the parameters.
20’Fhis is true if the relative wage is greater than 1.
28applying the aggregate labor constraint for skilled workers providesthe following steady-stateallocations
of production and R&D workers and variety in the innovating sector:
(A16) L~’= (r + k1
+ g)0L1~I(k,+ g + Or),
(A17) L,” = (1 — 0)(k1
+ g)L,~/(k1
+ g + Or),
(Al8) N,,, = i1(l — 0)L,,,/(k1
+ g + Or),
where L,,, is the total number of skilled workers in Country One.
Each innovating firm chooses how many R&D and production workers to hire, given the
production and innovation technology. For the sector as a whole, this decision involves a tradeoff
because of free entry and the aggregate labor supply constraint. Firms have to take into account the
temporary state of their monopoly, because some goods go out offashion and the production ofhigh-tech
goods are continually being transferred to the low-technology sector. As aresult, innovation occurs in
the steady state. Free entry ensures firms have to charge the competitive price and earn zero long run
profits. On the demand side, consumers also face a tradeoffbetween consuming a greater quantity of
goods (characterized by 0) or having greater variety available (given by 1-0). Thus, in the steady state,
the tradeoff between production and R&D workers, and therefore quantities and varieties, is the
fundamental tension that keeps the equilibrium at its steady-state values.
THE LOW-TECHNOLOGY SECTOR
The low-technology sector produces only goods forwhich technologyis internationally available.
This technology comes from the two innovating sectors. Thus, technology is transferred not only from
one country to another, but between sectors within acountry. Defining Nc as the number of variety in
the low-tech sector attime t, equationAl9 describes the rate of changeof variety in non-innovating sector:




k~ is the rate at which technology is transferred from the innovating sector in country j to the non-
innovating sector.
Substituting in the steady-statevalues of N,,, and N2,, into equations A19 yields the steady-state
solution for N0, given by:2’
r110\1 k L ik2L
(A20) N = / I 1 lh + 2 2h £ L g j [k,+g+Or k2+g÷Or
Production in this sector occurs in a perfectly competitive input and output market in the sense that free
entry and constant average costs ensure zero profits. The production technology for low-technology
workers is given by:
(A21) Q0
=
where a0 is the productivityparameter associated with low-tech workers. In equilibrium, the real wage
equals marginal product; that is:
(A22) P0
= W0/a0.
21This equation is a firstorder linear difference equationwhich asymptotically reaches asteady state.
The equation is insensitive to changes in initial conditions.
30TABLE 1
HIGH TECHNOLOGYINDUSTRIES
ISIC 350 Chemical products






ISIC 310 Food, beverages and tobacco
320 Textiles, apparel and leather
330 Wood products and furniture
340 Paper products and printhg
360 Non-metallic mineral products
370 Basic metal industries
381 Metal products
31TABLE 2









domestic world low—tech labor
X3






world, domestic high—tech labor
X5 = remainder term [equation 20]
VAL [ VAL VAL
= ln ih / i0 value added
L,h ~
32*Note:




AR coefficient: France .690 .103 .000
AR coefficient: W. Germany .882 .039 .000
AR coefficient: Italy -.418 .265 .059
AR coefficient: Netherlands .118 .199 .277
AR coefficient: Norway .990 .189 .000
AR coefficent : Sweden -.162 .203 .213
AR coefficient: UK .783 .111 .000
Xl: domestic high/low-tech labor .160 .046 .000
X2: domestic/world low-tech labor .498 .040 .000
X3: ROW/domestic innovation -.089 .019 .000
X4: world/domestic high-tech labor .462 .045 .000
X5: remainderterm -.624 .022 .000
VAL: high/low-tech value added .207 .022 .000
)ependent variable is high-tech/low-tech wage.
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